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Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions

Jinzhong Niu and Simon Parsons. Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions. Computing Research Repository (CoRR), abs/1304.3135, 2013.
Extended version of the AAMAS'13 paper.

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, showing that the maximal matching algorithm is favored in scenarios where trading volume is a priority and that it may possibly improve allocative efficiency over equilibrium matching as well. A parameterized algorithm that incorporates both maximal matching and equilibrium matching as special cases is also presented to allow flexible control on how much to trade in a double auction.

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BibTeX

@ARTICLE{niu-corr13-mv,
  AUTHOR =       "Jinzhong Niu and Simon Parsons",
  TITLE =        "Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions",
  journal   = {Computing Research Repository (CoRR)},
  volume    = {abs/1304.3135},
  year      = {2013},
  ee        = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.3135},
  bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de},
  wwwnote = "Extended version of the AAMAS'13 paper.",
  abstract = niu-aamas13-mv-abstract,
}

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