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Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions

Jinzhong Niu and Simon Parsons. Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2013), Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, 2013. Extended Abstract.

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a novel, non-recursive, maximal matching algorithm for double auctions, which aims to maximize the amount of commodities to be traded. It differs from the usual equilibrium matching, which clears a market at the equilibrium price. We compare the two algorithms through experimental analyses, showing that the maximal matching algorithm is favored in scenarios where trading volume is a priority and that it may possibly improve allocative efficiency over equilibrium matching as well. A parameterized algorithm that incorporates both maximal matching and equilibrium matching as special cases is also presented to allow flexible control on how much to trade in a double auction.

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BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{niu-aamas13-mv,
  AUTHOR =       "Jinzhong Niu and Simon Parsons",
  TITLE =        "Maximizing Matching in Double-sided Auctions",
  BOOKTITLE =    aamas13,
  EDITOR =       "Ito and Jonker and Gini and Shehory",
  YEAR =         "2013",
  ADDRESS =      "Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA",
  note = {Extended Abstract.},
  abstract = niu-aamas13-mv-abstract,
}

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